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PERJACOBSSON
Economic Aduuer
to the Ban.k for InternationaL Seulements'tIEgratitude each student of economics feels to the National
Bureau of Economic Research finds fittingexpression at this
jubilee and I wish to add my own thanks for all I havelearned
from the data and their interpretation in theNational Bureau's
valuable publications. My teacher in Upsala, the lateProfessor
David Davidson, complained once that "aneconomist has not
only to guess the explanation of what hashappened but often
unfortunately also to guess what actually hashappened". If today
we know so much moreabout the sequence of facts in the eco-
nomic field it is largely due to the intelligentlyplanned and
painstakingly pursued work of the National Bureauof Economic
Research.
It is concerned primarily with nationaldata relating to eco-
nomic conditions in the United States.This is all to the good in
view of the position the United Statesholds today in world
affairs. Is not nearly one-half of the world's outputof industrial
raw materials processedby American industries? And the na-
tional income of the United States accountsfor practically 40
percent of the sum total of thenational incomes of all the differ-
ent countries in the world.
But in addition to national statistics,global figures are increas-
ingly required to understand theeconomic and financial trends
of our time. As regards the compilationand presentation of inter-
national statistics a tremendous stepforward was achieved by the
League of Nations. The Bank forInternational Settlements, with
its relatively small staff, has itselfcompiled original series only
in some particular fields, e.g.,international short-term indebted-
ness; amounts allottedand disposed of in cleaiing and similar
65accounts; and the composition of note circulations. The work of
the Bank's Economic and Monetary Department has beenrather
to analyze and interpret data already published by other offices.
There is, in fact, a tremendous amount of published materialbut
often not enough effort directed toward eliciting what it allsig-
nifies. We would do well to remember the dictum of thegreat
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "the significance offacts is
more important than the facts themselves; and if we knowthe
significance we may even forget the facts".
Much has been said at this meeting about the dutyof econo.
mists toward policy makers. While I heartilyapprove of the new
tendency of American economists to takea guiding hand in pub-
lic affairs, I wish to give itas my opinion that in a democracy
economists have a primary duty toward thepublic. In myown
country, Sweden, it has come to be recognized thatthe publicas
such is entitled to know whatleading economists in the land
think about the economic andfinancial problems of theday.
Economists may not always find iteasy or opportune to state their
opinion, but surely theywould fail in their task if theywere to
hold back and makeno attempt to enlighten andinfluence
public thinking.
In studying priceproblems, I think thatinternational influences
should be examinedeven more closely than they havein the past.
In peacetime,as long as exchange rates remainstable, price levels
tend, as we know,to move in step, but thetwo world wars have taught us thateven in wartime stronginternational influences
make themselves felt.As may beseen from Chart I, in The Netherlan, Sweden,and Switzerland thelevels of wholesale prices during 1914-18and the postwardepression movedvery much in thesame way, indicating thatinternational influences were also factors ofgreat importance. It iscurious to think back on the discussions thattook place in thesecountries at the time: in each thecharacter ofgovernment financingor a rise in wages and other costswas held to have beenthe factorprimarily respon-
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sible for the price movements, while littleattention was paid
to an upward or downward pull from abroad.
In the smaller countries of Europe the relationshipwith for.
eign markets is necessarily so intimate that the international
aspect cannot long be overlooked.
ThIsss Mces I
Thu Nstbudads Ssu, aid Stzsdaid
As regards the United States, foreign observers cannot help
feeling that often too little attention is paid to the international
influence on the domestic price level. Such an influence makes
itself felt not only through the volume of actual exports and
imports but also through the effect the mere possibility of deal-
ings with foreign producers and traders has on domestic price


























l4195 161718 19192021 22 23 24l92526 27 28 29193031 32 33 34193536 37 38 39lI04tPER JACOBSSON
costs of production in the United States rose sharply,as a result
mainly of a sudden 15 percent rise inwage rates; but a corre
sponding rise in the American price levelwas held back, as I see
it, by the resistance offered by worldprices, then determjne(J
chiefly by conditions within the sterlingarea. The resulting dis-
equilibrium in the cost and pricestructure furnished, inmy
opinion, the main explanationof the setback in businessthat
occurred in the course of 1937. In thisconnection, may I make
two observations:
1 strongly concur with theview often expressed byWalter
Stewart: that economists shouldexamine more fully than they
have recently been in thehabit of doing thecauses and phases
of particular economicoccurrences, such as the boom and the
bust of 1936-37. Justas doctors gain their knowledge froma
close examination ofparticular cases, soa detailed analysis
of economicevents ought to bring amost useful additionto
our understanding of the factorsmaking for economicchange.
Economists who reject the viewthat the prolongedstagnation in the 'thirtieswas due primarily to a lack ofinvestment op-
portunities will be reallyconvincing only when theyare able to put forward a coherentalternative explanation ofthe eco-
noniic troubles that besetthe world in thatremarkable decade.
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opinion still prevailed as to the best form of, and the limits to
be observed in, government intervention, butto give only one
exampleit was soon taken for granted that if the gold standard
was to be retained at all, there would have to be a strong element
of management in it.
Concerning these consequences of the depression there is, I
think, general agreement, but concerning the cawces of the de-
pression there is still much uncertaintyeven more than actual
disagreement. In part, of course, the depression may be regarded
as the downward turn of an ordinary business cycle,undoubtedly
intensified by coincidence with an agricultural depression. But
what was the exact influence of political factors, including the
reparation tangle? And how did unwise international lending
complicate the situation? Could any other credit policy have
helped matters? And did a shortage of gold actually contribute
to the fall in prices? Note that the fall in prices wasthe root trou-
ble from which most of the other difficulties arose, being chiefly
responsible for the monetary convulsions from 1981 onward and
the paralysis of so much of the international credit system.
If we proceed to examine to what extent the gold scarcity con-
tributed to the fall in prices, we soon find that national statistics
do not suffice; we have to throw the net much wider and look at
monetary developments in all the gold-standardcountries and
the movements of gold between countries. But even in selecting
and arranging our data we are embarrassed by the fact that no
communis opinio doctorum still obtains as to the influence of
gold on the trend of prices. Here it is not possible for me to
examine the fundamental problem of the relation between gold
and prices (for this would necessitate a rather prolonged, partly
mathematical analysis) but it may be of interest to make some
observations of a rather general character.
Knut Wicksell distinguished clearly between three monetary
influences on prices (while increasingly admitting, as his life
went on, other than purely monetaryfactors). There was for him
a difference in theinfluence exerted by: (a) a budget deficit coy-
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ered by issues of newlycreated money; (b) the currentgold
production leading to a direct increase inmonetary purchasing
power to the extent that the new gold is acquiredby the central
banks; and (c) the credit policyof the central bank and thecom-
mercial banking system (e.g.,the influence exerted bya too high
or too low rate of interest).
Wicksell held that newlyprnduced gold (so faras it became
available for monetarypurposes) led to a direct increase inthe
active volume ofmonetary purchasing power and thatthis in-
crease was sufficiently strongto explain, for instance, the risein
prices from 1896to 1914. Originally, he had thoughtthat the new
gold acted on pricesvia the credit system, i.e.,through its effect
on credit conditions; but,as he explained so clearly in theintro- duction to his Lectures(first published in Swedishin 1906) and
as noted by Professor CharlesRist in the I-iistoire desdoctrines relatives au creditet a la monnaie depuis JohnLaw jusqu'dnos jours (Paris, 1938;see pp. 299-306), he changedhis mindon this point, adopting theview that the influenceexerted by goldwas essentially of a directnature in that thenew monetary demand
which came into thehands of goldproducers as the centralbanks acquired the new goldwas increased ina repetitive fashion (or, as we should nowput it, with a kind ofmultiplier effect). Unfor-
tunately_and forreasons I cannot understand_theintroduction to the Lectureswas not included inthe Englishtranslation pub- lished in 1935.
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If it is correct that the current gold production and itsdistri-
bution are of preponderant importance1 then the influenceof
the stocks of accumulated gold must be relegated to asecondary
place as compared with the movements of gold. I shouldlike to
point out in this connection that even those who attachprimary
importance to the influence of the actual gold reserves onthe
conditions of credit (as affected, inter alia, by cover percentages
and. similar provisions) usually proceed, when they have to ex-
plain the influence of gold, to give an example showinghow a
gold movement from one country to another exercises arestric-
tive effect on the credit policy in the market losinggold and has
the opposite effect in the market gaining gold, whichall helps to
restore a monetary equilibrium, so that"blessed are those who
lose and blessed are those who gain the gold"the essenceof the
old gold standard, according to a Scotch friendof mine. The
choice of the examples shows clearly that alsoaccording to this
theory great importance is attached to the movementsof gold.
Indeed, irrespective of the basic theory adopted, theproblem
would seem to become in practice a question ofdetermining
to what extent a flow of gold helps tosustain monetary purchas-
ing power in the different countries; and inthis connection it
must be remembered that as a rulethe main gold movements are
constituted by the distribution of newly producedgold among
the different countries.
The need for increased monetary purchasingpower usually
arises from the current increase in the nationalproduct as re-
vealed by national income. I have tried to calculatethe aggregate
total of, and the increase in, the nationalincome of all the gold
standard countries for 1900, 1915, and 1929,assuming a 2.8 per-
cent rate of increase for 1900and 1913; i.e., slightly less than the
famous 3 percent calculated by ProfessorCassel; for 1926-29 the
rate of increase seems tohave been about 4 percent. (Note, how-
ever, that the latter percentagerefers to what were essentially
boom years and therefore does not represent an averagefor a
prolonged period of booms and depressions.)
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The average annual increase in monetary gold stocks,repre-
senting newly produced gold available for monetarypurposes,
was at the rate of $160 million around 1900 and $250 million in
1913; and it may be put at $230 million in 1929.
If we concentrateour attention on the two years 1913 and 1929,
we find that in the fonneryear the relation between theamount
of gold available formonetary purposes and the increase inthe
national income wasas 1 to 11, while in the latteryear it was as
1 to 29. The change inthe relation was dueto three distinct
causes: (a) a slight fall in theamount of gold available formone-
tary purposes; (b) a higherrate of growth in the nationalincome
in 1929 than in 1913(4 percent instead of 2.8);and (c) a higher
price level in 1929 thanin 1913, wholesaleprices in 1929 being
40 percent and thecost of living at least 60percent above the
1913 level.
In dollar value thenational income in 1929was about twice as
high as in 1913; of theincrease, about 30percent seems to have been due to realgrowth in output andthe rest to a rise inprices. The price risewas thus a very importantfactor but, curiously












Millions of Millions of
U. S. dollars Percentages U.S. dollars
1900 58,000 2.8 1,600
1913 95,000 2.8 2,700
1929 200,000 4.0 8,000wy
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From the above figures it is plain that thecurrent gold pro-
duction contributed less to sustaining prices in 1929 than in 1913.
But this is not the whole story. Largely because of therate at
which the French franc was stabilized in 1926-28, France took
more than her proportionate share of the world's annual gold
production in 1927-30. Indeed, countrieson the continent of
Europe which hadand this was generally thecaseto reconsti-
tute their monetary reserves, absorbed together more than the
entire current output of gold (notwithstanding the widespread
application of the gold exchange standard). This led, ofcourse,
to a lop-sided distribution of the newly produced gold. Some
important countries obtained no new goldon balance. For ex-
ample, the monetary gold stock of the United Stateswas, in
1934, slightly below what it was in 1924. This meant that in the
crucial years 1924-34 the American economy receivedno real
help from the arrival of new gold in sustaining its price level.
It is logicaland not paradoxicalto deduce from these facts
that the United States, despite its accumulated stocks, felt the
impact of the shortage of gold. The fall in prices began outside
Europe and, so far as the shortage of gold may be said to have
been a contributing factor, it must have affected especially the
price levels in certain large extra-European markets.
During wars prices rise. For example. Chart 2, depicting price
movements in the United States, since 1800, shows first a great
rise during the Napoleonic Wars, then during the Civil War
and, then again, during the first World War. After the Napo-
leonic Wars prices went back to a level even below that obtain-
ing before the rise started; after the Civil War also the price
level soon returned to and even went below its prewar leveL
After the first World War an attempt was made from 1923 on-
ward to stabilize average prices at a level that in terms of whole-
sale prices was some 40 percent and in terms of the cost of living
fully 60 percent above the prewar. The remarkable stability of
the price level up to 1929 aroused hopes that at last the problem
of how to maintain stable prices had been solved. But by 1932
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average prices had fallen below the 1913 level. Now another
world war has raised prices far above the 1939 level but not as
yet in terms of gold much above the average for 1914. We must
watch carefully the signs of the times to ensure that we do not
again commit the mistake of trying to stabilize in gold at an
unsuitable level.
It may, however, be asked whether the monetary authorities
in the United States should not have so arranged their credit
policy around 1929 as to have brought about a sufficient credit
expansion to meet the monetary requirements of a rising pro-
duction? They were indeed on the horns of a dilemma:
To provide more monetary purchasing power via the credit
system the rates of interest had to be low and credit otherwise
freely supplied; but
to prevent the dangerous boom that had arisen in the mar-
ket for capital assets (share quotations becoming higher and
higher) from running to excess (which it unfortunately did)
rates of interest had to be raised.
It sometimes seems to be assumed that there issome perfect
credit policy to be applied on every occasion. That isnot the case;
on the contrary, credit policy shares with other policies the dis-
advantage of often being a choice between evils.
In this respect a theorist has least of all the rightto look down
his nose at the practical people. Some of theessential problems
have not yet been solved even theoretically.Let us return to the
one just indicated: to increase the volume of purchasingpower
through the granting of credit it isnecessary that more should
be lent than the savingsout of already existing income, for lend-
ing of such savings would merelytransfer existing purchasing
power, not increase the total amount. DavidDavidson pointed
this out many years ago,as was mentioned by Brinley Thomas
and F. A. Hayek and also by GottfriedFlaberler in Prosperity and
Depression (1939 ed.,p. 35), from which the following extract is


































































































































































































don and transactionsrises, the flow of money must be increaseti
in order to keep theprice level stable. Therefore, the rate of
interest must be kept at alevel low enough to induce a net inflow
of money into circulation.The rate which stabilizes the price
level is below the rate atwhich the demand for loaned capital
just equals the supplyof savings."
Haberler says that allowance mustbe made for this discrep-
ancy, but does notfurther investigate the consequences. It would,
however, seem as if the maintenanceof so low a rate might easily
act as a stimulus to adangerous booma circumstance that might
be of great importance in ananalysis of booms and depressions.
Alvin Hansen mentions the sameproblem in his essay on
Stability and Expansions included in Financing A in en can Pros-
perity, A Symposium of Economists, published in New York in
1945. In a note on page 225he writes: "investment each year must
in fact exceed the savings made out of 'disposable' income in
Robertson's sense, in order to make possible a rise in income
commensurate with rising productivity. This excess of invest-
ment would normally be financed by an increase in bank credit,
which in a growing society must occur in order to provide suffi-
cient circulation media to transact the ever-growing volume of
trade at stable prices and in addition to provide sufficient money
(currency and demand deposits) to ensure the necessary degree
of liquidity required to maintain a low rate of interest."
Several thoughtful economists have thus recognized the prob-
1cm, without, however, as it would seem, always realizing all its
important implications. Here is, indeed, a problem largely inter-
national in character, which for its solution requires much fur-
ther research, factual and theoretical. But perhaps it is too much
to ask the institution we honor today to become also an Inter-
national Bureau of Economic Research.
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